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The Transition From Property to People: The Road 
to the Recognition of Rights for Non-Human 
Animals 
Derek W. St.Pierre* 
By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured? 
-Regina v. Dudley and Stevens! 
We are not just rather like animals; we are animals. 
-Mary Midgley2 
The classification of a living being as property has long been an effec-
tive tool in perpetuating the subordination of that being. By defining a 
living organism as property, the law has already decided what limits to 
place on protecting the interests of that individual. 3 "To label something 
property, is, for all intents and purposes, to conclude that the entity so la-
beled possesses no interests that merit protection and that the entity is 
solely a means to the end determined by the property owner.,,4 
Not long ago, the concept of property included various classes of hu-
mans. In the Seventeenth contury, Africans brought into the United States 
were bought and sold as chattel. 5 During this same period, women, once 
*The author is a 1998 graduate of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
He would like to thank those involved in the process that became this Note, especially Law-
rence Weiss, Jo Carillo, Bruce Wagman, Lisa Scanlon and Christine Troy. 
1. 1881-85 All E.R. 61 (Q.B. 1884). 
2. MARY MIDGLEY, BEAST AND MAN at xiii (1978). 
3. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 49 (1995). 
4. Id. at 253. 
5. See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 
17 CARDOZOL. REV. 1711, 1779 (1996). 
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married, became the property of their husbands.6 Possibly the biggest bar-
rier to the exertion of rights by either group was their status as property. 
By definition, this categorization relegated both slaves and married women 
to a position without any legally cognizable rights. 
Similarly, the subordination of non-human animals7 stems from a re-
fusal to recognize that animals have interests of their own. In the eyes of 
the law, non-human animals are property.8 As such, they are imprisoned, 
tortured, mutilated, raped and even killed with the endorsement of our jus-
. 9 bce system. 
This Note looks at the use of the legal classification of "property" as a 
tool to subordinate living beings and the means to overcome this subjuga-
tion. It begins by describing the concepts of property and rights. Next, 
this paper turns to setting forth the concept of animal rights and the current 
position of non-human animals in this country. Then two historic exam-
ples, American slavery and married women, are used to illustrate how the 
definition of living beings as "property" has been used as a tool of subor-
dination. These examples are then employed to illustrate the current posi-
tion of animals in society. In order to change that position, there must be a 
social reformulation of the concept of non-human animals as property into 
one that views them as beings with individual rights. This analysis con-
cludes with some suggestions to move society towards that goal. 
CLASSIFICATION AS PROPERTY AND THE SOCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF RIGHTS 
The study of property is the study of social relations. lO Property rights 
are significant in their ability to create expectations of specific treatment in 
social dealings with others. ll This conception of property rights is central 
to our moral and legal structure. 12 
The Anglo-American concept of property creates an artificial legal 
dualism with two primary types of entities: persons and property.13 De-
6. See WINSTON E. LANGLEY & VIVIAN C. Fox, WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
7 (1994). 
7. The term "non-human" is used to describe "animal" in order to accentuate the artifi-
cial nature of the human-animal dualism pervasive in our language. Humans are animals. 
8. See DAVID S. FAVRE & MURRAY LORING, ANIMAL LAW 21 (1983). See also 
FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 35. In addition, the Uniform Commercial Code defines 
"animals" as "goods," thus their sale is regulated it. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1995). 
9. Examples include the food industry and factory farming; the fur industry and wire 
cages or steel leg-hold traps; the scientific communities' psychological and biomedical 
testing; as well as the entertainment industries' use of fear and pain to coerce performance. 
10. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY at xxxiii (3d ed. 1993). 
11. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
347 (1967). 
12. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 106. 
13. See Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 397, 
434 (1996). 
Summer 1998] NON-HUMAN ANIMALS 257 
spite the wealth of lofty debate over philosophical conceptions of property, 
this note looks instead at this abstract concept on its most basic, concrete 
level. "Property" has value solely as a means to an end, whereas "people" 
are ends in themselves. Property law is "a set of legal relations between 
persons governing the use of things.,,14 Legal theorists argue that there 
cannot be any legal relations between persons and things and that things 
cannot have rights. IS Being in the latter category, property is understood as 
that which does not have any interests of its own that must be respected. 
However, the division between the concepts of "people" and 
"property" is not as logical it appears. Inanimate objects sometimes fall 
into the category of people,I6 and living beings can find themselves in the 
category of property.I7 The consequence of this classification is that le-
gally recognized people have rights and property does not. 
A right is generally viewed as "a moral trump card that cannot be dis-
puted.,,18 As such, a right serves as a protection that cannot be sacrificed, 
even if the outcome is illogical. In our legal system, "people" are the only 
holders of rights. 19 By classifying an entity as property, the legal system 
denies that entity the ability to assert rights in its self-interest. Effectively, 
the only rights that exist in terms of property are the rights of the owner. 
NON-HUMAN ANIMALS AND RIGHTS 
A great deal of literature is devoted to the philosophical debate on 
whether or not animals deserve rights. 20 This Note begins with the as-
sumption that the life of an animal has inherent value which should be 
protected through the recognition of legal rights. The basis for this as-
sumption lies at the intersection of science and philosophy. According to 
evolutionary theory, the difference between species is not one of distinct 
categories, but merely one of degree?I There is nothing in this degree of 
difference that is so great as to justify the domination visited by our spe-
14. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 27 (1977). 
15. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 27 (1988). 
16. Corporations and ships are considered people for purposes of the law and can sue or 
be sued. 
17. See FAVRE & LORING, supra note 8, at 21. See also FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 35. 
18. F'RANCIONE, supra note 3, at 412, quoting, JAMES M. JASPER & DOROTHY NELKEN, 
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS CRUSADE 8, 29 (1992). 
19. This philosophical debate is wrapped up in two types of rights: moral and legal. For 
purposes of this Note, the discussion is limited to legal rights. A legal right is one that is 
recognized and enforced by the legal system. Although morals affect and strongly influence 
the legal system, moral rights lack formal remedies within this system. By definition, legal 
rights are the only rights our current society is bound to recognize. 
20. See, e.g., TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 327-29 (1983). See also PETER 
SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 1 (2d ed. 1990). 
21. See Ernst Mayr, Introduction to CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES at vii, 
vii-xxvii (1964). 
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cies upon other species of this planet. 22 Humans do not possess any char-
acteristics which are not shared by at least one other species. 23 Non-human 
animals use tools, communicate with language, display emotions, have so-
cial relations, establish cultures, display rational thought and even exhibit 
altruism. 24 The converse is also true. There are no shortcomings displayed 
by non-human animals that are not also reflected in human behavior.25 Our 
society values and protects the rights of every human--even the most se-
verely mentally handicapped humans-some of whom lack both the ca-
pacity to use language and to think rationally, are given protection under 
the law. Currently, our society limits its circle of moral concern by impos-
ing inherent value only on the lives of humans, without any rational basis 
for that limitation. In the spirit of social evolution, it is time to expand our 
circle of moral concern and respect the value of non-human life. Leaving 
the specific extent of rights for non-human animals to the philosophers, the 
general precepts to strive toward include freedom from imprisonment, as 
well as from the infliction of pain, suffering or death. 26 
A meaningful discussion of rights requires a discussion of how rights 
are enforced or asserted. Yet, speaking of rights in terms of self-assertion 
creates a problem regarding the rights of animals. Since animals cannot 
speak for themselves, who is to assert their interests? Our legal system al-
ready confronts and resolves this problem when dealing with children, 
mentally incompetent individuals and others who are deemed unable to 
represent themselves. Guardians ad litem and next friends are appointed to 
advocate for the best interest of that individual and could serve the same 
purpose for non-human animals.27 
MODERN SOCIETY AND NON-HUMAN ANIMALS 
The current prevailing attitude towards non-human animals in this 
country can be described as legal welfarism. This is the notion 
"represented by and in various legal doctrines, that animals, which are the 
property of people, may be treated solely as means to ends by humans as 
long as this exploitation does not result in the infliction of 'unnecessary' 
22. See Gary Francione, Keynote Speech at the University of Oregon Land Air Water 
Conference (Mar. 14, 1997) (Video recording on file with the University of Oregon). 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. Any meaningful discussion of this would also include maintenance of livable habitat. 
27. " ... An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed represen-
tative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ... for the protection of the infant or in-
competent person." FED. R. CIv. P. 17(c). This represents a potential solution within our 
existing legal framework. The degree of social change argued for herein would require 
considerable legal restructuring as well; adequate representation of non-human animal inter-
ests would be at the center of that reorganization. 
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pain, suffering, or death.,,28 As property, non-human animals are meant to 
be used in a reasonable and efficient manner. Consequently, the value of 
non-human animals is measured only in terms of their usefulness to hu-
mans, not in terms of any interests they may have in their own right. 
Legal welfarism embraces the reasonable and efficient, but "humane" 
use of non-human animals. Animal welfarists work to improve the condi-
tions under which animals are kept and used. However, their theory of 
humane use can be seen as a rhetorical concept because it would be diffi-
cult to find an individual specifically espousing a pro-cruelty ethic. Even 
the largest exploiters of animals might claim that they treat their animals 
well and have every incentive to do SO.29 
The state regulates the use of animals through anti-cruelty statutes.30 
Yet, cruelty statutes are designed to prevent "unnecessary" suffering, and 
do not create anything equivalent to "rights" for non-human animals. 31 
According to David Favre, the use of cruelty statutes to establish criminal 
sanctions seeks to fulfill three social goals: "first, to proscribe certain hu-
man actions as unacceptable in our society; second, to decide that a mini-
mum level of care is due to any animal; and finally, to protect the eco-
nomic interest that animals represent to their owners.,,32 Our legal system 
is structured, however, such that virtually any treatment of a non-human 
animal can be justified as some sort of "necessity.,,33 Arguably, the value 
28. FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 18. 
29. Members of the industry trafficking in animals could claim that unless they properly 
feed and care for their animals, they could not produce a high quality product. Further, in-
dustry members could also claim that raising animals is their livelihood and any abuse of 
such animals cuts into their profit. 
30. All 50 states have anti-cruelty statutes. For summaries of those statutes see Henry 
Cohen, State Statutes Prohibiting Cruelty to Animals, Congressional Research Service, The 
Library of Congress (1992). The language of California Penal Code § 597 is fairly repre-
sentative, although the potential penalties are stiffer than most. It states: 
[E]very person who overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, over-
works, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, drink, or shelter, 
cruelly beats, mutilates, or cruelly kills any animal, or causes or procures any 
animal to be so overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded, over-
worked, tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, drink, shel-
ter, or to be cruelly beaten, mutilated, or cruelly killed; and whoever, having 
the charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, subjects 
any animal to needless suffering, or inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the 
animal, or in any manner abuses any animal, or fails to provide the animal 
with proper food, drink, or shelter or protection from the weather, or who 
drives, rides, or otherwise uses the animal when unfit for labor, is, for every 
such offense, guilty of a crime punishable as a misdemeanor or as a felony or 
alternatively punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony and by a fine of not 
more than twenty thousand dollars. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 597(b) (West 1998). 
31. See Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439 (1983). 
32. FAVRE & LORING, supra note 8, at 122. 
33. See, for example, Section 59 of Article 27 of the 1957 Laws of Maryland, which 
states: "Customary and normal veterinary and agricultural husbandry practices including but 
•••••• _____________ II!IIIll __ IIIIIII __ !11111111 _____________ ....... ii':'*'W',;~~~ 
T 
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of the life of a non-human animal is caught up in a cost benefit analysis so 
heavily weighted in favor of even the most frivolous human "benefit," that 
the protections provided by cruelty statutes are practically nonexistent. 
Non-human animals are currently categorized as personal property?4 
In theory, all non-human animals within the boundaries of the United 
States are owned either by a private individual or by the government.35 
David Favre summarizes the rights of non-human animal owners as fol-
lows: the right to convey, the right to consume, the right to use as collat-
eral, the right to obtain the natural dividends of the animal and the right to 
exclude others?6 Owners of non-human animals can resort to all the nor-
mal property protections offered by the law, i.e. the owner can sue for: 
conversion, larceny, tortious injuries, punitive damages and even mental 
anguish. 37 However, owners have the authority to disregard these protec-
tions. Since non-human animals themselves have no legal rights, if owners 
do not assert that there is a right, then no rights for humans or non-humans 
will be exercised. ,,38 
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SOCIETY 
This current position of non-human animals in our society results from 
a long history of subjugation and domination by humans over humans. 39 
Science, theology and social myths have all played a part in establishing 
modem relationships between human and non-human animals. 
The work of Charles Darwin and evolutionary theory mark the begin-
ning of modem biology. As shown in Darwin's The Descent of Man, the 
theory of evolution denies the existence of a privileged status for humans: 
"[t]here is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mam-
mals in their mental faculties ... [t]he difference in mind between man and 
the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of 
kind." 40 Yet, science only influences and does not define society. The 
historical justifications for human domination over non-human animals 
runs much deeper. 
Historically, Western culture has understood the universe as a linear 
hierarchical ascendancy.41 This concept, known as the Great Chain of 
not limited to dehorning, castration, docking tails, and limit feeding, are not covered by the 
provisions of this section." 27 MD. ANN. CODE § 59 (1957) (West 1998). 
34. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 34-35. 
35. See id. at 40-46. 
36. FAVRE & LORING, supra note 8, at 48. 
37. See id. (See Chapter Four for discussion). 
38. See id. 
39. See Steven Wise, How Nonhuman Animals Were Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe, 
1 ANIMALL. 15 (1995). 
40. CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN 72, 80 (London, 1871). 
41. See Wise, supra note 39, at 24. 
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Being, is one of the most powerful presuppositions in Western thought.42 
The Great Chain of Being is the idea that there is a natural hierarchy, in es-
sence a ladder, which designates a place for everything.43 Location on the 
ladder is ordained by a designed and ordered universe.44 Plants occupy the 
lower rungs, non-human animals are further up the ladder, humans are 
even higher up and the upper rungs are occupied by angelic forms with 
God atop the whole.45 
The Great Chain of Being has been central to the development of 
thought in Western systems; specifically, two reasons are given as the jus-
tification for the legal status of animals as property.46 The first has a 
theological basis, established in the Bible. In Genesis, man is given 
"dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over 
the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps 
upon the earth.,,47 A second justification rests in the "inferior" status of 
non-human animals. Historically, non-human animals were viewed as 
lacking a "soul," a "mind," a "will," or whatever attribute it was thought 
makes humans uniquely human.48 The Great Chain of Being fed into and 
supported this idea because only those beings on the upper rungs, humans 
and angelic beings, were found capable of rational thought. This second 
reason is a classic creation of the concept of "other." By focusing on dif-
ferences, accentuating what separates human animals from non-human 
animals, our society has created yet another of its many dualisms by which 
animal exploitation is justified.49 
This creation of a dualism and "other" through the confluence of sci-
entific and social rationale spawns some interesting anomalies. For ex-
ample, the use of non-human animals in vivisection places those animals 
somewhere in a state of limbo. Modern science presumes that non-human 
animals are genetically similar enough to humans that experiments on them 
will help to predict human reaction. Yet it is also simulatneously posited 
that non-human animals as so different that they do not merit ethical con-
sideration or legal protection. 
BLACK AMERICANS AND SLAVERY 
"When law made a man or a woman into a thing to be bought and sold, 
it did more than any other legal maneuver ... to degrade the humanity of 
42. See id. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. at 25. 
45. See id. 
46. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 36-37. 
47. Genesis 1:26. 
48. See Wise, supra note 39, at 19-26. 
49. Some examples of common socially constructed dualisms include: white-black, male-
female, straight-gay, rich-poor, young-old and so on. 
"' ti M¥pI 
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black Americans.,,5o The designation of a group of humans as property is 
the ultimate form of degradation. Slavery has existed since before re-
corded history and finds mention in the earliest recorded body of laws, 
Hammurabi's Code.51 Regardless of legal justifications, slavery has still 
been defined as "a system of domination, degradation and subordination, 
in which some people are allowed in effect to treat other persons--other 
human beings with God-given rights-as property rather than persons.,,52 
All aspects of law surrounding slavery were designed to benefit the 
slave owners, not the slaves.53 The legal protections offered to slaves were 
not for slaves as individuals, but to protect the property value of a slave to 
the slave's owner. 54 Once the legislatures designated slaves as personal 
chattel, the elaboration of the rights of this new property was left to the 
courtS.55 The expansion of common law in this area turned slaves into the 
objects of mortgages, assignments, inheritance, seizure, bailment, insur-
ance and warranties. 56 
Slavery in America originally arose as a response to economic greed.57 
The realization of the full economic potential of the English colonization 
of North America was dependent on large numbers of unskilled agricul-
turallaborers.58 After several failed attempts at enslavement of the native 
peoples, enslaved Africans proved to be most profitable means of filling 
this need. 59 
In the United States, plantation owners only enslaved racially distinct 
people.60 Subsequently, this racial distinction gave rise to the rationale for 
enslavement. The explanations for slavery arose only after the practice 
50. Wiecek, supra note 5, at 1777. 
51. Seeid.atI714. 
52. Akhil R. Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 403,405 (1993). 
53. See William W. Fisher III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.-
KENTL. REV. 1051, 1056 (1992-93). 
54. See id. at 1070. 
55. See Wiecek, supra note 5, at 1779. 
56. See id. at 1779-80. 
57. See id. at 1711. 
58. See id. at 1712. 
59. The original colonial settlers enslaved Indian war captives, Africans, and even Eng-
lish men and women. Both Indian war captives and fellow English men and women were 
difficult and inefficient laborers. Indian war captives, with their knowledge of the surround-
ing land and the ability to live off of it often escaped slave holders, presumably to return to 
their tribes. The English were poor laborers, unaccustomed to the heat. Further, escaped 
English slaves could assimilate back into colonial society without recognition of their for-
mer status. On the other hand, African slaves were racially distinct, easily identifiable and 
in a foreign land. See, e.g., Wiecek, supra note 5, 1735-55. 
60. Although restrictions on liberty within the same race existed, i.e. indentured servi-
tude, Caucasians were never viewed in the same way as African slaves. African slavery was 
viewed as perpetual, established from birth, and the subjects of that slavery were viewed as 
property. Indentured Caucasians, although sacrificing a number of freedoms within their 
servitude, were always granted some degree of protection by the law as they were only 
serving in a temporary role. See Fisher, supra note 53, at 1051-52. 
FMSiM 
Summer 1998] NON-HUMAN ANIMALS 263 
was in full force. 61 The justifications for slavery were rooted in religion, 
culture and science. The Bible provided Noah's "Curse of Ham." To 
punish Ham, Noah cast Canann, the son of Ham, out of his land and cursed 
him: "a servant of servants shall he be unto his brothers.,,62 Although nei-
ther the Bible nor Christian tradition identified the race of Ham or Canann, 
Jewish tradition identified Ham as the father of the black African race. 63 
Religion marginalized the status of Africans in other ways as well. To 
the English, and later the Americans, the people of Africa were heathens. 
African spiritualism and earth-centered totemism were incomprehensible 
to the English whose minds were bound by their Christian theology. Hea-
thenism did more than reinforce the difference between Africans and Eng-
lish, it suggested that Africans were "depraved, defective, and something 
other than human.,,64 
African culture was also a source used to justify this subordinate 
status. African dress, or lack thereof, was a marked contrast to the conser-
vative English attire. 65 African housing-mud wattles and palm thatch-
was different and viewed as inferior. 66 The English found African mar-
riage and family customs alien to their own understanding of proper rela-
tionships, especially those embracing polygamy, polygyny, concubinage, 
matriarchy and clan customs.67 These African familial structures were not 
only a source of difference, they were seen as developing from both an 
untamed nature and a sexuality often categorized as animalistic.68 
Science likewise played its part in the justification of slavery. Carolus 
Linnaeus created the modem biological system of classification of plants 
and animals.69 Linnaeus' classification system divided Homo Sapiens into 
six types based on physical characteristics and the color metaphor. 70 This 
classification was used not only to reinforce the perception that Africans 
were different, it was also misinterpreted to feed into the much older con-
cept of the Great Chain of Being. The organizational scheme of the Chain 
61. See id. at 1751. 
62. Genesis 9:25 (The story is extrapolated from the deluge legend in Genesis. It is said 
that one day Noah passed out drunk and naked. One of his sons, Ham, found Noah and ran 
and told two of his brothers about their father. The two brothers respectfully covered up 
their father. After Noah awoke and sobered up, he was furious over the lack of respect 
shown by Ham when he ran and told others about Noah's condition.). 
63. See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 35 (1968). 
64. Wiecek, supra note 5, at 1731. 
65. Seeid.at 1732. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. 
68. The characterization of African sexuality as animalistic places Africans lower on the 
evolutionary chain and reinforces the difference or otherness of Africans from the English 
norm. See Fisher, supra note 53, at 1063. 
69. See Wiecek, supra note 5, at 1733. 
70. See id. 
264 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:2 
was seen as an uninterrupted progression upward. Linnaeus' unranked 
classification became hierarchical when his ideas were merged into the 
Chain.71 The lowest human type, the African Hottentot, was placed just 
above the highest non-human, presumably a simian, and the highest human 
type, the European male, was just below the angelic realm.72 Thus racism, 
and consequently slavery, was now supported by scientific rhetoric. 
An outgrowth of this scientific argument was the concept that an Afri-
can had no mind, or lacked the "will" to truly be a person. Slaves were 
born "weak in body and mind" -in essence nature had created them for 
slavery.73 These were not just lay justifications, but arguments relied upon 
by the legal system. In Creswell's Executor v. Walker, the Alabama Su-
preme Court declared that a slave "has no legal mind, no will which the 
law can recognize.,,74 
THE TRANSITION OF SLAVES FROM PROPERTY TO PEOPLE 
The Thirteenth Amendment was an outgrowth of the Civil War, which 
was, in many ways, a struggle over ideals. The Thirteenth Amendment 
marks the official end of slavery in this country. 75 It also begins the trans-
formation for a whole class of living beings from being defined as 
"property" to gaining recognition as "people." 
The principles fought over in the Civil War were for some Americans 
the very same as those disputed in the American Revolution.76 As the 
Declaration of Independence set out: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, 
and the pursuit of Happiness.,,77 Foreigners were among the first to focus 
on the inherent contradiction between the ideals espoused in the Declara-
tion of Independence and the continuation of slavery?8 As illustrated be-
low, some of the Northerners of the new nation agreed and understood "all 
men" to include slaves. 
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 echoed the above sentiments 
71. See id. at 11-12 (explaining the Great Chain of Being). 
72. See id. 
73. See Paul Finkleman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal 
Development, 68 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 1009, 1022 (1993). 
74. Creswell's Executor v. Walker, 37 Ala. 229,236 (1861). 
75. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
76. See Finkleman, supra note 73, at 1017. 
77. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
78. Finkleman, supra note 73, at 1019 (For example, "the English Tory Samuel Johnson 
was known to have asked, 'How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the 
drivers of negroes?"'). Id. 
m Q~ 
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of liberty and equality.79 In fact, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held 
that these words, in light of the Revolution, ended slavery. 80 The Court 
could find no justification for denying slaves the "natural rights of man-
kind" and held that we all share "that innate desire for liberty which 
heaven, without regard to complexion or shape, has planted in the human 
breast. ,,81 
The Pennsylvania legislature reflected a similar perspective of Revo-
lutionary ideology and rhetoric.82 The passage of the Pennsylvania Grad-
ual Abolition Act of 1780 spelled out the Pennsylvania legislatures' rec-
ognition of the rights common to all individuals. "Negro and Mulatto 
slaves . . . [could no longer be denied] the common blessings that they 
were by nature entitled to.,,83 The perspectives of both Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania show the recognition of the similarity between slaves and the 
rest of their society. The Virginia Supreme Court also expressed its con-
cerns by the freeing of a family of mixed racial ancestry because they 
"lacked any visible features of Negroes." 84 This breakdown in the concept 
of "other" eroded the foundation upon which differential treatment was 
based. 
The visible distinction of racial difference helped to perpetuate slav-
ery. Race provided a justification for the inapplicability of the Declaration 
of Independence. As one Louisiana slave holder put it, all men were cre-
ated "free and equal as the Declaration of Independence holds they are .... 
But all men, niggers, and monkeys aint [sic]." 85 
Although the thirteen original colonies were all slave holding, by the 
Nineteenth century slavery was a geographically sectional institution. Ar-
guably, the regions which had moved beyond economic dependence on ru-
ral agricultural labor recognized rights for Blacks and outlawed the prac-
tice of slavery. As the power and influence of the North grew, conflict 
ensued, followed by the Civil War, the Thirteenth Amendment and the end 
of slavery. 
79. "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural and inalienable rights, 
among which may be reckoned the right of defending their lives and liberties; that of acquir-
ing, possessing and protecting property, and in fine of seeking and obtaining their safety and 
happiness." [d. at 1017. 
80. See Commonwealth v. Jennison. The text of this unreported 1783 Massachusetts 
case is reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW AND FREEDOM OF BONDAGE 36 (1986). 
81. Finkleman, supra note 73, at 1017. 
82. See id. 
83. [d. 
84. [d. at 1020. 
85. [d. (quoting JAMES OAKES, THE RULING RACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
SLAVEHOLDERS 143 (1982». 
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WOMEN AND THE SOCIAL RECLASSIFICATION OF 
MARRIAGE 
As with slaves, the subjugation of women was based on the classifica-
tion of living beings as property in order to facilitate domination and to 
reinforce male power structures. However, the property status of women 
differed from that of slaves. Slaves had no legal existence outside of their 
classification as property.86 Women, on the other hand, only became prop-
erty upon marriage, when "the very being or legal existence of the woman 
[was] suspended . . . or at least incorporated and consolidated into that of 
the husband.,,87 The following discussion addresses only this particular 
form of control. Although women's "property" status under marriage, or 
coverture, is only one part of the historical domination of women and can-
not be looked at in a vacuum, the following discussion focuses on this 
classification for its symbolic and legal value. 
The role of women in American society has traditionally been in the 
home.88 Since colonial days, social customs and legal rules were used to 
perpetuate this structure.89 Women were given responsibility for maintain-
ing the house and all its domestic affairs. Social institutions such as mar-
riage foreclosed women's ability to do anything outside of the home. Fol-
lowing English common law tradition, upon marriage women lost their 
ability to sue, to own property and in general to gain any recognition in the 
eyes of the law. 90 In the words of a colonial woman, "marriage is a kind of 
preferment; and ... to be able to keep their husband's house, and render 
his situation comfortable, is the end of her being.,,91 
The justifications for women's subordinate position run parallel to the 
justifications for slavery. Religious, cultural and scientific arguments were 
relied upon to support the subordination of women. In Genesis, God him-
self is said to have declared to women that "your desire shall be for your 
husband, and he shall rule over yoU.,,92 Social customs became self-
fulfilling prophecies. The traditional role of women working in the home 
fed on itself so that "homemaker" was no longer a role but the "natural" 
place for women. As women came to be relegated to the "private" sphere 
of the home, men in contrast dominated the "public" sphere of government, 
86. Slave women occupied an even lower tier in the scheme of things. The property 
status of a slave trumped everything. Masters had no obligation to recognize marriage and 
marriages were often broken up as a form of control, punishment or even economic conven-
ience. 
87. LANGLEY & Fox, supra note 6, at 7. See also Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 
811 (Missouri, 1959). 
88. See LANGLEY & Fox, supra note 6, at 7. 
89. See id. 
90. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (1899). 
91. LANGLEY & Fox, supra note 6, at 69. 
92. Genesis 3:16. 
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trade, business and law.93 This separate sphere ideology rationalized the 
exclusion of women from political and economic self-rule. 94 
In addition, biological difference played into and reinforced these 
stereotypes. Women, the physically weaker sex, were seen as delicate and 
less rational, therefore unable to handle the rights reserved for men. 95 The 
most pervasive scientific justification for this attitude came from defining 
(white, upper-class) men as the embodiment of a "fully human being.,,96 
Once white males were set up as the standard, then everyone else was dif-
ferent. Consequently, women as "different" (other) were relegated to a 
subordinate position in society.97 
THE TRANSITION OF MARRIED WOMEN FROM PROPERTY 
TO PEOPLE 
The end of classification as property was less of a watershed for 
women than for slaves. Still, although more of a gradual switch, it was no 
less important. During the last half of the Nineteenth century, some states 
began passing Married Women's Property Acts.98 These acts redefined the 
legal position of women within a marriage by recognizing women's rights 
as individuals within marriage. In other states, the laws of marriage were 
rejected and some couples even exchanged feminist wedding vows that re-
defined the marriage relationship and specifically condemned the tradi-
tional laws.99 Women signed petitions to pressure states to amend their 
constitutions to include the rights of women. 100 
At this time significant social change was also taking place in other ar-
eas of women's lives. The first women's college was established in 
93. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETI, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 
2 (1993). 
94. See id. 
95. See LANGLEY & Fox, supra note 6, at 14. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 80. 
99. See id. at 108. An excerpt of the 1855 marriage vows of Elizabeth Stone and Henry 
Blackwell is reprinted below: 
Id. 
We believe that personal independence and equal human rights can never be 
forfeited, except for crime; that marriage should be an equal and permanent 
partnership, and so recognized by law; that until it is so recognized, married 
partners should provide against the radical injustice of present laws, by 
every means in their powers .... We believe that where domestic difficulties 
arise, no appeals should be made to legal tribunals under existing laws, but 
that all difficulties should be submitted to the equitable adjustment or arbi-
trators mutually chosen. Thus reverencing law, we enter our protest against 
rules and customs which are unworthy of the name, since they violate jus-
tice, the essence of law. 
100. See id. at 80. 
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1837. 101 The first woman was admitted to medical school in 1847. 102 The 
first National Women's Rights Convention was held in 1850.103 Hence, 
the end of the Nineteenth century saw women working increasingly outside 
of the home. 
THE MEETING OF SLAVES, MARRIED WOMEN AND NON-
HUMAN ANIMALS 
The shift from "property" to "people" is but the first step in the rec-
ognition of legal rights. The discussion here does not meant to suggest that 
the affected groups of American slavery or marriage are examples of 
groups that have successfully achieved equality within our society. Rather, 
both groups were selected as examples precisely because of their continu-
ing struggle for social equality and the light that this evolution can shed on 
the relationship and interconnectedness of different forms of oppression. 
This analysis examines how that struggle began and how the first recogni-
tion of their rights occurred with their change in legal status. 
Underlying the shift from "property" to "people" is a major change in 
the way society views the groups who are objectified. A major part of the 
story behind this transition is the deconstruction of the concept of "other." 
The justifications for the property status of slaves and women were all re-
inforcements of the "otherness" of that class of people. Slaves were a dif-
ferent skin color than those in power. Slaves were also seen as primitive, 
heathenistic, animalistic and intellectually inferior. Women were a differ-
ent sex than those in power. Women were also seen as weaker, less ra-
tional, more emotional and intellectually unable to handle the realities of 
the public sphere. 
The social, political and scientific deconstruction of these differences 
was the predecessor in the shift of the legal status of both slaves and mar-
ried women. By including slaves in their understanding of "men" in the 
Declaration of Independence, the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania colonies 
were able to look past cultural and religious difference to the logical simi-
larities. Likewise, women's status within marriage shifted after the suc-
cess of female individuals in the traditionally male public sphere. The 
creation of the first women's college,104 the graduation of the first women 
from medical school and increasing numbers of women working outside 
the home all preceded the recognition of women's rights within a marriage. 
These moves away from the concept of "other" forced society to question 
the foundation upon which the institutions of slavery and coverture in 
marriage were built. As these examples illustrate, without support, it is 
10 1. See id. at xxxi. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. at 87. 
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only a matter of time before a repressive structure collapses. 
The institution of animal persecution is founded on the same type of 
socially, politically and scientifically unstable ground under which slaves 
and women were oppressed. Non-human animals are, obviously, a differ-
ent species. The social construct of "species" is but the creation of differ-
ence, the reinforcing of "other." To what point in the ancestral evolution 
of humans should our circle of moral concern extend? If our closest evo-
lutionary predecessor existed today, would we extend rights to her or him? 
There is no scientific rationale that provides humans with the distinct and 
superior position in nature that they have assumed. As stated earlier, non-
human animals use tools, communicate with language, display rational 
thought and even exhibit signs of altruism. 105 Non-human animals express 
emotions and develop their own relationships and cultures. 106 
In addition, social and political evolution cannot be taken out of its 
economic setting. The United States experienced a considerable amount of 
economic change during the Nineteenth century. The ultimate rationale 
behind the classification of both slaves and women as property was in the 
economic benefit that it provided. Pre-Civil War agriculture was ex-
tremely labor intensive. The Industrial Revolution and the creation of ma-
chines that improved the efficiency of agriculture eased the demand for un-
skilled agricultural labor. This technological change was related to the 
undermining of the economic dependence on slaves to harvest agricultural 
crops. Similarly, the Nineteenth century brought increasing numbers of 
women outside of the home for employment. 107 This exodus of women 
from the home altered financial dynamics within the home. Women were 
no longer solely financially dependent on husbands. Hence, the climate of 
economic change laid the groundwork for social, political and legal 
change. 
The economic interests implicated in the status of non-human animals 
as property are enormous. In this country alone, billions of animals are 
slaughtered each year for human consumption. 108 Yet, the true economic 
expense of the animal industry is not borne by business. The economic 
pressures for social evolution are being artificially staved off. For exam-
ple, government subsidization of animal agriculture defrays its true cost. 
Further, the environmental impact of pollution from factory farms is not 
105. For a discussion of animal sentience see REGAN, supra note 20, at 3-33. See also 
ROBERT GARNER, ANIMALS, POLmcs, AND MORALITY 11-21 (1993). 
106. See REGAN, supra note 20, at 3-33. See also GARNER, supra note 105, at 11-21. 
107. See REGAN, supra note 20, at 3-33. See also GARNER, supra note 105, at 11-21. 
108. For an overview of the treatment of animals used for food, see MICHAEL W. Fox, 
FARM ANIMALS: HUSBANDRY, BEHAVIOR AND VETINARY PRACTICE (1984). See also JIM 
MASON & PETER SINGER, ANIMAL FACTORIES (1980); JOHN ROBBINS, DIET FOR A NEW 
AMERICA 48-145 (1987). 
as 
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regulated. 109 If animal agriculture were faced with economic reality, 
forced to bear its own costs without government subsidization and respon-
sibility for its environmental impact, its days would surely be numbered. 
MOVING FORWARD 
Society must change dramatically before the recognition of the rights 
of non-human animals can occur. Just as in the cases of slavery and cover-
ture, the artificial socially created differences assigned to non-human ani-
mals must be deconstructed. Challenge to these social constructs can take 
shape within the legal discourse in at least three ways: recognition of the 
social value of non-human animals through tort litigation, recognition in 
statutory language of non-human animals' self-interest in their own lives 
and breaking down the species barrier by challenging and restructuring 
standing doctrines. 
One way to recognize and establish the social value of non-human 
animals is through loss of companionship tort litigation for companion 
animals. Tort law plays a normative role in our society.llo Tort law both 
reflects and shapes the values of society. III Increasingly, courts have been 
willing to recognize valuation of companion animals above their fair mar-
ket value. 112 This increased valuation is a recognition of a companion 
animal's worth beyond mere property status. The recognition of this value 
achieves two ends: first, it acknowledges the social significance of human 
and non-human relationships. Second, it questions the status of non-
human animals as property. Consequently, pursuit of the recognition of 
loss of companionship under tort law can drive the legal discourse forward. 
The recognition of non-human animals' interest in their own lives can 
be accentuated by inclusion of their interest in statutory language. Statutes 
are enacted to regulate the use of non-human animals. Although most 
statutes pertaining to non-human animals purport to protect them, the stat-
utes in fact do little to provide this safety. If language recognizing the self-
interest of animals was inserted, there would be less room for compromise 
in the interpretation of the statutes, as well as more room to argue for ex-
pansion of animal rights. 
Finally, the most significant step in the direction of rights for the non-
human animal can be made by expanding the standing doctrine to allow the 
rights of non-human animals to be litigated in their own interest. Standing 
109. The Clean Water Act minimizes the regulation of animal agriculture by defining it as 
non-point source emission. The CW A only regulates discharge from point sources. See 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1314,1329 (West 1998). 
110. See Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion 
Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1059, 1083 (1995). 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
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is a prerequisite for the enforcement of rights. 1 13 Currently, our legal sys-
tem limits use of the courts to natural persons and other legally recognized 
entities such as corporations and ships. However, standing for a grove of 
trees has been recognized by a Supreme Court Justice. 114 Likewise, non-
human animals, ecosystems and other non-traditional parties have been 
named in suits, but each has had at least one real person named as a co-
party. In order to move forward, we must establish standing for an animal 
to sue in her or his own right. Our closest living relatives, chimpanzees, 
share 98.4% of our genetic material. 115 Chimpanzees are one of science's 
animals of choice for vivisection precisely because of this degree of simi-
larity. If chimpanzees are scientifically similar enough to appear as our 
proxy in the laboratory, what makes them so different that they should be 
barred from the court? 
The above suggestions fit very closely into the general categories of 
justification for the oppression of animals. Recognizing loss of compan-
ionship for domestic animals tugs at our notions of social interaction and 
emotional dependence. Inclusion of statutory language recognizing the 
interests of animals goes exactly to the heart of what our morals comprise. 
Breaking down the species barrier questions the scientific validity of where 
we draw the outer edge of our circle of concern. 
CONCLUSION 
Classifying beings as property is a powerful tool of oppression used to 
quell animal rights today. However, just as slaves and married women 
were able to overcome insurmountable odds and achieve freedom from the 
property status, non-human animals stand today at that brink, awaiting lib-
eration. Although the law does not strictly dictate norms to society, it is an 
integral and powerful part of it. Advocating change within the legal sys-
tem is an effective means of pushing forward social evolution toward the 
cessation of oppression in all of its forms. 
113. See FRANC lONE, supra note 3, at 67. 
114. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
115. JARED DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE: THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF THE 
HUMAN ANIMAL 20-23 (1992). 
